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1 
ALDABA V. PICKENS: POLICE EXCESSIVE FORCE AND 
MENTALLY DISTURBED INDIVIDUALS 
ABSTRACT 
In Aldaba v. Pickens, the Tenth Circuit effectively destroyed the 
protection that qualified immunity is meant to afford law enforcement 
officers. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of Aldaba due to the 
decision’s reliance on unclear law less than one year after the Tenth Cir-
cuit issued this muddled opinion. This Comment explores Aldaba and 
explains how the Tenth Circuit took great liberty with the doctrine of 
qualified immunity in its decision and how its decision affects situations 
where police officers are responding to requests for help in subduing 
aggressive, mentally disturbed individuals. This Comment will discuss 
the ways in which the court skewed material facts in order to rely on 
ambiguous law, misapplied qualified immunity standards, and distorted 
precedent. This Comment explains that the Tenth Circuit’s ruling inap-
propriately created a new standard for police use of force in circumstanc-
es involving mentally disturbed individuals. Under the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in Aldaba, police officers must fear every choice they make 
when it involves a mentally unstable individual. To rectify this, it is nec-
essary to depart from the Tenth Circuit trends Aldaba set and to develop 
an alternative examination of use of force that reinstates the purpose of 
qualified immunity and provides police officers with a more reasonable 
standard to rely on in use-of-force determinations when responding to the 
mentally disturbed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a health care worker in a hospital setting. The 
duties of your job require you to provide medical care and comfort to the 
patients of the hospital. While working, a patient becomes agitated, ag-
gressive, and mentally unstable. This patient becomes so disturbed that 
he removes the tubes and needles from his arm, which were providing 
medication and liquids he desperately needs. He refuses to allow you to 
help him and leaves his medical bed. He is in such an aggressive frenzy 
that you feel you must seek help from others in order to calm him down 
and prevent him from hurting himself, you, or others. You call the police 
because you expect them to be able to handle the situation and subdue 
this hysterical patient. 
Now imagine you are the police officers who arrive on scene. You 
are expected to calm down a patient who has already refused to calm 
down for medical staff. The patient is screaming, dripping blood, wan-
dering the halls, and refusing to listen to anyone. You are told that if he 
leaves the hospital, he may die due to his medical condition. How do you 
2 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
react in a split second in order to determine the best course of action? 
You ask the patient to calm down and to cooperate more than once, but 
he refuses. What do you do next? You fear that if you use any amount of 
force, you may be sued, but you are left with no other choices. You must 
either react to the situation or let the patient leave without the medical 
care he needs. If you are unable to use force to subdue this individual, 
but the duties of your job require you to protect him and those around 
him, do you feel that your hands are tied? 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individuals may seek damages from gov-
ernment officials, including police officers, who have violated constitu-
tional or statutory rights.
1
 However, in order “to ensure that a fear of 
liability will not ‘unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their du-
ties,’” police officers may claim qualified immunity.
2
 If the officers 
“have not violated a ‘clearly established’ right, they are shielded from 
personal liability.”
3
 Even in instances where a police officer may have 
proximately caused the deprivation of a constitutional right, the officer 
will not be held liable under § 1983 unless he or she did so in an objec-
tively unreasonable manner.
4
  With regard to excessive force, the Su-
preme Court has held that “claims are properly analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than 
under a substantive due process standard.”
5
 Under this standard, a police 
officer “might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mis-
taken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in 
those circumstances. If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires 
is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.”
6
  
Recently, the Tenth Circuit took such great liberty with this doctrine 
that it almost completely negated the purpose of qualified immunity. 
Rather than affording police officers reasonable discretion in interpreting 
the appropriate amount of force to employ during the course of their du-
ties, it created new review standards regarding the use of force involving 
individuals of diminished capacity. In Aldaba v. Pickens,
7
 the Tenth Cir-
cuit denied qualified immunity to police officers who tased an uncooper-
ative and aggressive hospital patient, yet the Tenth Circuit only accom-
plished this by creating an unwarranted factual dispute; relying on un-
clear law; and by stating, in effect, that it is always unreasonable to use a 
taser on mentally disturbed individuals. This decision implied a shift in 
the Tenth Circuit toward a heightened standard of review for officers 
  
 1. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011). 
 2. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). 
 3. Id. at  2031 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 4. See Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 900–01 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 5. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
 6. Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 NEV. 
L.J. 185, 192–93 (2008) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001)). 
 7. Aldaba v. Pickens, 777 F.3d 1148, 1156 (10th Cir. 2015) cert. granted, judgment vacated, 
136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
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evaluating a situation and deciding the appropriate level of force to use in 
a split second, even though, as both the Supreme Court and the Tenth 
Circuit acknowledge, the “‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force 
must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
8
 The Tenth Circuit im-
posed an injudicious ruling that raises the use-of-force standard to an 
unrealistic level of care specifically when dealing with mentally dis-
turbed individuals despite the stress, potential danger of the situation, and 
lack of hindsight. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of Aldaba 
due to its reliance on unclear law
 9
 just nine months after the Tenth Cir-
cuit issued its deficient opinion. This Comment will show that Aldaba 
misapplied qualified immunity standards by ignoring material facts and 
relying on ambiguous law. Furthermore, Aldaba distorted precedent to 
effectively destroy the purpose of qualified immunity by inappropriately 
creating a new standard for police use of force in circumstances involv-
ing mentally disturbed individuals. An alternative examination of use of 
force when dealing with mentally disturbed individuals is now required 
in order to reinstate the purpose of qualified immunity and to provide 
police officers with a more reasonable standard to use in their use-of-
force determinations.  
Part I of this Comment will discuss the background of qualified 
immunity, the mental health of an individual, and the use of tasers in 
relation to use of force. Part II will examine the relevant details of Alda-
ba. Part III will explore Aldaba’s qualified immunity examination, the 
Tenth Circuit’s ruling, its inconsistencies with other circuits, and the 
problems that it created. Part III will also briefly suggest an alternative 
standard to employ when examining taser use in situations involving the 
mentally disturbed.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Qualified Immunity in Relation to Use of Force 
Over time, qualified immunity has evolved, and different jurisdic-
tions now employ varying levels of qualified immunity.
10
 Police officers 
are immune from liability for violating constitutional principles that they 
could not have reasonably known at the time of the violation.
11
 An exam-
ination of this generally consists of two distinct principles: first, whether 
  
 8. Id. at  1155 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
 9. Pickens v. Aldaba, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
 10. See, e.g., Michael S. Catlett, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law and the Qualified 
Immunity Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1034–36 (2005); David R. Cleveland, Clear As Mud: 
How the Uncertain Precedential Status of Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity 
Determinations, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45, 45–48 (2010); Richard B. Golden & Joseph L. Hubbard, 
Jr., Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Defense: Hope’s Legacy, Neither Clear Nor Established, 29 
AM. J. T RIAL ADVOC. 563, 563–64 (2006). 
 11. Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 NEV. 
L.J. 185, 186 (2008). 
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an officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and second, whether 
that right was clearly established at the time such that the officer should 
have known of it.
12
 Qualified immunity for executive officials developed 
through the case of Pierson v. Ray.
13
 In Pierson, the Court ruled that 
where officers are “sued under the Fourth Amendment . . . [s]o long as 
they are reasonably mistaken . . . [they] are immune from personal liabil-
ity.”
14
 The Supreme Court has indicated that this doctrine is intended to 
protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate 
the law.”
15
 While originally examined from both subjective and objective 
views, qualified immunity has evolved into a purely objective standard.
16
  
The Supreme Court has held that excessive force, deadly or not, 
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
standard.
17
 This examination requires careful consideration of the nature 
and quality of the intrusion weighed against applicable governmental 
interests.
18
 In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court described three 
factors in determining whether use of force is excessive: 1) the severity 
of the crime at issue; 2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to 
the safety of the officers or others; and 3) whether the suspect is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
19
 The Court 
acknowledged, “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized 
that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries 




While the analysis put forth in Graham is generally sufficient for 
cases involving typical criminal arrests, a slightly different approach is 
prescribed for cases dealing with protective custody issues given that the 
governmental interest presented is in preventing a mentally disturbed 
individual from harming him or herself.
21
 Examinations must take this 
additional factor, risk of self-harm, into account.
22
 Further, circuits have 
acknowledged that the actual extent of an individual’s mental illness 
  
 12. Id. at 185–86. 
 13. Id. at 186. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986). 
 16. Stacey Haws Felkner, Proof of Qualified Immunity Defense in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 or 
Bivens Actions Against Law Enforcement Officers, 59 AM. JURIS. PROOF OF FACTS 3D SERIES 291 
(2000) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982)). 
 17. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
 18. Id. at  396. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Giannetti v. City of Stillwater, 216 F. App'x 756, 762 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Determining 
whether force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires 
a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment 
interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”); Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 
1468 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the community from the 
mentally ill and in protecting a mentally ill person from self-harm.”). 
 22. Id. 
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B. Mental Health in Relation to Use of Force 
The Tenth Circuit examined mental health of a detainee in relation 
to use of force in Giannetti v. City of Stillwater.
24
 In Giannetti, a woman 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder was taken to a municipal jail after avoid-
ing arrest for traffic violations.
25
 She exhibited odd behavior, including a 
statement that she would eat one of the officers with liver and onions.
26
 
At the jail, she was defensive and aggressive; when she refused to 
change into a jumpsuit, officers handcuffed her and struggled with her, 
using physical force to change her clothes as she kicked and dug with her 
nails.
27
 The woman died after the struggle; the declared cause of death 
was anoxic encephalopathy resulting from probable cardiac dysrhythmia 
due to restraint and positional asphyxia.
28
 The Tenth Circuit recognized 
that “a detainee’s mental health must be taken into account when consid-
ering the officers’ use of force and it is therefore part of the factual cir-
cumstances.”
29
 With this in mind, the Tenth Circuit held that the officers 
did not use excessive force.
30
 The court reasoned that in light of the 
woman’s “evidently irrational behavior and assuming the officers’ famil-
iarity with her mental history, we cannot conclude that the officers used 




Circuits do not rule consistently on situations involving questions of 
excessive force in dealing with mentally ill individuals.
32
 In a situation 




 23. See, e.g., Giannetti, 216 F. App’x at 764; Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 
893, 904 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 24. Giannetti, 216 F. App’x at 764. 
 25. Id. at  758–60. 
 26. Id. at  758. 
 27. Id. at  758–60. 
 28. Id. at  761. The cause of death here is a medical condition where a person’s body position 
results in an impaired ability to breath, lack of oxygen in the brain, and erratic heartbeat or heart 
rhythm, which can ultimately lead to death. See, Cardiac Dysrhythmia, ONLINE-MEDICAL-
DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.online-medical-dictionary.org/definitions-c/cardiac-
dysrhythmia.html; Encephalopathy, EMEDICINEHEALTH, 
http://www.emedicinehealth.com/encephalopathy/page2_em.htm; U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., 
Cerebral Hypoxia, MEDLINEPLUS (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001435.htm. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY CENTER: POSITIONAL ASPHYXIA—SUDDEN DEATH, 
(Jun. 1995), for more information on positional asphyxia.  
 29. Giannetti, 216 F. App’x at  764. 
 30. Id. at  766. 
 31. Id. at  765 (citation omitted). 
 32. Compare Giannetti, 216 F. App’x at  764 (finding reasonable force used in physical strug-
gle with handcuffed woman diagnosed with bipolar disorder), with Champion v. Outlook Nashville, 
Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 904 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding Fourth Amendment rights violation when officers 
pepper sprayed a handcuffed, nonverbal man diagnosed with autism). 
 33. Champion, 380 F.3d at  896.  
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The Sixth Circuit held, in Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., that po-
lice were not entitled to qualified immunity in an excessive force claim 
that arose in dealing with a nonverbal man, diagnosed with autism, who 
was physically struggling with officers even after being handcuffed, 
bound at the ankles, and sprayed with pepper spray.
34
 The man died due 
to cardiac arrest.
35
 In this situation, involving the death of a mentally ill 
individual after a physical struggle with police officers similar to Gian-




The Ninth Circuit has also stated that the mental state of an individ-
ual must be considered when examining the constitutionality of a particu-
lar use of force. In Deorle v. Rutherford, the Ninth Circuit explained that 
in instances where an “emotionally disturbed individual is ‘acting out’ 
and inviting officers to use deadly force . . . the governmental interest in 
using such force is diminished by the fact that the officers are confronted 
. . . with a mentally ill individual,” as opposed to an individual who has 
committed a crime against others.
37
 The court declined to  “adopt a per se 
rule establishing two different classifications of suspects: mentally disa-
bled persons and serious criminals.”
38
 Instead, the court stated, “[W]here 
it is or should be apparent to the officers that the individual involved is 
emotionally disturbed, that is a factor that must be considered in deter-
mining, under Graham, the reasonableness of the force employed.”
39
 
There, the court held it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to fire 
a less-than-lethal bean bag round at “an unarmed man who: has commit-
ted no serious offense, is mentally or emotionally disturbed, has been 
given no warning of the imminent use of such . . . force, poses no risk of 
flight, and presents no objectively reasonable threat to the safety of the 
officer or other individuals.”
40
 In Deorle, the court emphasized the men-
tal state of the man in light of the lack of threat posed by him and the 
lack of warning before use of the less-than-lethal bean bag round.
41
 The 
Deorle holding illustrates that the distinction between situations with and 
without a threat of harm and with and without a warning before using 
force is key to use-of-force determinations.  
C. Tasers in Relation to Use of Force  
The examination of excessive force with regard to the use of tasers 
also requires special consideration.  Tasers, also known as “conducted 
energy devices (CEDs)” or “electro-muscular-disruption (EMD) technol-
  
 34. Id. at  895–98. 
 35. Id. at 898. 
 36. Id. at 896. 
 37. Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1285. 
 41. Id. 
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ogy,” are devices that transmit an electrical impulse when in contact with 
the body or clothing, generally resulting in an immediate loss of the per-
son’s neuromuscular control and the ability to perform coordinated ac-
tion for the duration of the impulse.
42
 These devices are generally con-
sidered a less lethal option that “enable police to defuse a potentially 
violent situation without resorting to deadly force.”
43
 On countless occa-
sions, these devices have allowed officers to neutralize potentially dan-
gerous situations with “decreased injuries to suspects and officers,” and 
they “have repeatedly been documented in dramatic life-saving sto-
ries.”
44
 Concerns regarding the use of tasers and their overall safety have 
been raised.
45
 A review of medical and epidemiological data indicates 
that the results, while inconclusive overall, suggest that the benefits of 
taser use outweigh the suggested risks.
46
 An examination of taser use 
noted: 
Even assuming that all 213 suspect deaths studied . . . were “Taser-
related,” this number must be compared with the 606,000 . . . de-
ployments on suspects and 758,000 on volunteers. . . [resulting in a] 
fatality rate of .0156%. Such a low fatality rate . . . demonstrate[s] 
that the Taser, while not without risk, is a relatively safe weapon, or 
at least a weapon whose benefits outweigh its risks.
47
 
In some instances, circumstances leave an officer with two options: 
use a taser or shoot the individual; many, with good reason, avidly 
advocate for the use of the taser over the shooting.
48
 
Police have not reached a consensus on appropriate taser use.
49
 Law 
enforcement agencies often reference a Use-of-Force-Continuum to es-
tablish appropriate levels of officer force, yet across agencies, “the min-
imum stage for acceptable [t]aser use range[s] from the passive-
resistance stage to the assaultive (physical injury) stage.”
50
 Across cir-
cuits, the split is just as defined.
51
 The level of force necessitated by the 
situation dictates whether the level of responding force, including use of 
a taser, is appropriate, but “different circuits hold that [t]asers constitute 
different levels of force, most holding that [t]asers are a gray area be-
  
 42. Donald L. Nevins, III, Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Failing to Equip 
Police with Tasers, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 225, 227–29 (2009). 
 43. Id. at  227. 
 44. Id. at  230–231. 
 45. See, e.g., Aaron Sussman, Shocking the Conscience: What Police Tasers and Weapon 
Technology Reveal About Excessive Force Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1342, 1345 (2012). 
 46. See, e.g., Nevins, supra note 42, at 226 (arguing that failure to supply police officers with 
tasers could amount to deliberate indifference exposing municipality liability).  
 47. Id. at 240. 
 48. Id. at 225. 
 49. E.g., Bailey Jennifer Woolfstead, Don’t Tase Me Bro: A Lack of Jurisdictional Consensus 
Across Circuit Lines, 29 T .M. COOLEY L. REV. 285, 285–91 (2012) (examining the lack of consen-
sus regarding taser use). 
 50. Id. at  291. 
 51. Id. at  304. 
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tween trivial and lethal force.”
52
 In some instances, the taser has been 
viewed as substantial force, yet analogized to the use of pepper spray.
53
 
In other instances, there has been a strong implication that tasers are 
more than a de minimis level of force but less than substantial force.
54
 In 
evaluating the reasonableness of taser use, “many cases result in quali-
fied immunity since the law is still evolving, and local law enforcement 
agencies across the country reflect differing views . . . some units only 
allowing for [t]asers when deadly force is allowed and others when any 
use of force is justified.”
55
  
With such ranging views on taser use and its degree of force, it log-
ically follows that taser use in the context of situations involving mental-
ly disturbed individuals is also extremely varied. It has been suggested 
that individuals with diminished mental capacity are particularly vulner-
able to the effects of tasers because such individuals “are more likely to 
react to the unfamiliar, painful, and frightening sensation of being tased, 
or threat of being tased, with panic that escalates the situation. . . [and] 
tasers may have unpredictable effects--or no effects--on mentally ill sus-
pects.”
56
 Still, whether or not mentally disturbed or mentally sound indi-
viduals are involved, most use-of-force examinations turn on the circum-
stances of the situation itself; while mental state is a factor that is taken 




II. ALDABA V. PICKENS 
A. Facts 
On the morning of March 24, 2011, Johnny Manuel Leija was hos-
pitalized due to dehydration and severe pneumonia.
58
 The pneumonia 
was causing low oxygen levels, affecting his mental state.
59
 While he 
was initially pleasant, cooperative, and responsive, his behavior later 
  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at  314 (discussing Landis v. Baker, 297 F. App’x 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
 54. Id. at 315 (citing Lewis v. Downy, 581 F.3d 467, 475, 479 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 55. Id. at  317. 
 56. Sussman, supra note 45, at 1360–61. 
 57. Compare Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 639 (6th Cir. 2015) (ruling use of taser and 
physical force was not unreasonable in light of qualified immunity with individual resisting arrest), 
and Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1073 (11th Cir. 2008) (ruling use of taser was reasona-
bly proportionate to need for force when dealing wit h belligerent individual in light of qualified 
immunity), with Bussey-Morice v. Gomez, 587 F. App’x 621, 622, 627 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 
(ruling use of taser with mentally disturbed individual refusing to cooperate in hospital did not 
violate of clearly established law in light of qualified immunity), and Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2012) (ruling use of taser with individual under the 
influence of cocaine and resisting arrest did not violate of clearly established law in light of qualified 
immunity). 
 58. Aldaba v. Pickens, 777 F.3d 1148, 1152 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 136 
S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
 59. Id. 
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changed.
60
 That evening, “a nurse found that he had disconnected his 
oxygen and cut his intravenous tube” and was bleeding from his arms 
such that “there was blood on the floor and the toilet.”
61
 At that time, Mr. 
Leija was confused and anxious but refused to take medication to control 
his anxiety and “accused the nurse of telling him lies and secrets.”
62
 He 
then “became increasingly uncooperative and aggressive,” and he shout-
ed that staff was attempting to poison him.
63
 The female nurse informed 
the doctor of the situation, and the doctor sent a male nurse to Mr. Leija’s 
room.
64
 Upon arrival, the male nurse discovered Mr. Leija had again 
removed his oxygen and intravenous tubes and was “yelling, ‘I am Su-
perman. I am God. You are telling me lies and trying to kill me.’”
65
 The 
male nurse attempted to calm Mr. Leija and persuade him to return to his 
bed, but Mr. Leija refused.
66
 Mr. Leija’s doctor directed the nurse to give 
Mr. Leija medication to calm him down, but again Mr. Leija refused.
67
 
The male nurse did not believe Mr. Leija could be restrained, and with 
the doctor’s approval, he called law enforcement officials to assist with 
“a disturbed patient.”
68
 The doctor was “increasingly concerned for Mr. 
Leija’s health given the behavioral and personality changes in Mr. Leija 
from earlier in the day.”
69
 Subsequently, Mr. Leija left his hospital room 
and began walking down the hospital halls.
70
 
Three police officers arrived to find Mr. Leija in the hall, visibly ag-
itated and upset.
71
 Medical personnel informed Officer Brandon Pickens 
that “Mr. Leija was ill and could die if he left the hospital.”
72
 Officer 
Pickens attempted to persuade Mr. Leija to calm down and return to his 
room.
73
 Mr. Leija refused and continued to insist that hospital staff were 
trying to kill him.
74
 Officer Pickens tried to reassure Mr. Leija and stated 
that no one was trying to kill him, but Mr. Leija continued to walk 
through the hallway toward the hospital lobby until he stopped, pulled 
out the intravenous ports from his arms, and clenched and shook his fists 
while saying, “This is my blood.”
75
 Deputies James Atnip and Steve 
Beebe testified in district court that they repeatedly ordered Mr. Leija to 
calm down and get on his knees.
76
 Mr. Leija did not comply, despite be-
  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (citation omitted). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (citation omitted). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1152–53. 
 74. Id. at  1153. 
 75. Id. (citation omitted). 
 76. Id. 
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ing warned several times that they would use a taser.
77
 After Mr. Leija 
failed to comply with commands, Deputy Beebe deployed his taser, strik-
ing Mr. Leija in the upper torso with one of the two taser probes.
78
 The 
taser had no effect, and a struggle ensued.
79
  
After the ineffectual taser strike, the officers grabbed Mr. Leija by 
the arms and thrust him against the wall, at which point one of the offic-
ers tased him again on the back of the shoulder with a “dry” sting by 
making direct contact to Mr. Leija with the electrical nodes of the taser 
without launching the penetrating barbs.
80
 This second taser attempt also 
appeared ineffectual.
81
 Thus, Deputy Atnip pushed his leg into the back 
of Mr. Leija’s knee and caused him and all three officers to fall to the 
floor.
82
 Mr. Leija continued to resist even after falling to the floor.
83
 The 
officers managed to restrain one of Mr. Leija’s arms in a handcuff and 
the other by holding it, allowing the male nurse to give Mr. Leija medi-
cations in order to calm him down.
84
 After medications were adminis-
tered, Mr. Leija went limp, grunted, and vomited clear fluid.
85
 The offic-
ers moved away, and medical personal began CPR on Mr. Leija.
86
 CPR 
efforts failed, and Mr. Leija was pronounced dead.
87
 
Mr. Leija’s cause of death was determined to be “respiratory insuf-
ficiency secondary to pneumonia, with the manner of death being natu-
ral.”
88
 The medical examiner testified that the taser shots could have in-
creased Mr. Leija’s need for oxygen and further stated that Mr. Leija’s 
physical exertion exacerbated his underlying condition.
89
 Mr. Leija’s 
physician testified that Mr. Leija’s handcuffed, facedown position on the 
floor could compromise the body’s ability to get oxygen.
90
  
B. Procedural History 
The district court held that the seizure of Mr. Leija was lawful; 
probable cause existed for taking him into protective custody based on 
his mental state and the threat he posed to his own health.
91
 The district 
court decided that there were “several material disputed facts relating to 
the objective reasonableness of the force the officers applied to seize Mr. 
  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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Leija.”
92
 The court stated the degree of resistance by Mr. Leija, in partic-
ular, was disputed; the surveillance footage of the encounter did not cap-
ture the entire event because Mr. Leija moved out of the frame of view.
93
 
Further, the district court concluded the record was “in dispute as to the 
threat Mr. Leija allegedly posed to the officers or the public.”
94
 It also 
held that the allegations that Mr. Leija was using his blood as a weapon 
were inconclusive because there was no evidence that his blood spattered 
the officers.
95
 It determined that “these material disputed facts precluded 
the issuance of summary judgment.”
96
 
C. Majority Opinion 
Judge McKay wrote for the majority joined by Chief Judge Bris-
coe.
97
 The majority examined excessive use of force and qualified im-
munity under the standards developed in Graham.
98
 It also added a factor 
to the Graham analysis by stating that the evaluation of use of force must 
take into account the fact that Mr. Leija was mentally disturbed and a 
risk to himself.
99
 It acknowledged that when “an individual poses a more 
severe and immediate threat to himself, a higher level of force may be 
reasonable in order to seize him for protective custody purposes.”
100
 It 
also referenced the Ninth Circuit, stating that even when “an emotionally 
disturbed individual is ‘acting out’ and inviting officers to use deadly 
force to subdue him, the governmental interest in using such force is 
diminished by the fact that the officers are confronted . . . with a mental-
ly ill individual.”
101
 Additionally, the majority stated, referencing the 
Ninth Circuit, that causing “grievous injury” to individuals being taken 
into protective custody does not serve the object of protecting the indi-
vidual.
102
 The court expressed that it must consider whether or not the 
police officers knew or should have known of the individual’s special 
susceptibility to harm from the particular type of force.
103
 The majority 
explained that, in Cruz v. City of Laramie, the Tenth Circuit established 
that officers may not use hog-tie restraints on individuals with an appar-
ent diminished capacity because the restraints are likely to result in sig-
nificant risk to the individual’s health due to the risk of positional as-
phyxia.
104
 The majority opinion did not provide a more concrete explana-
  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at  1154. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1151. 
 98. Id. at 1154. 
 99. Id. at 1155–56. 
 100. Id. at 1155.  
 101. Id. at 1156 (citing Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 102. Id. (citing Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th 
Cir.2003)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (citing Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir.2001)). 
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tion of how the risk of positional asphyxia is increased when dealing 
with individuals of diminished mental condition.  
With this background, the majority determined that “the severity 
and immediacy of the threat Mr. Leija posed to himself . . . weighs in 
favor of the application of some force.”
105
 It stated, however, that the use 
of a taser, when Mr. Leija was “clearly delusional and mentally dis-
turbed, weighs against the reasonableness” of force used.
106
 The majority 
decided that when faced with mentally ill individuals, officers “should 
make a ‘greater effort to take control of the situation through less intru-
sive means.’”
107
 It added that the diminished physical condition of Mr. 
Leija also weighed against the use of a taser.
108
  
Further, the majority declared Mr. Leija did not pose a threat to the 
officers or anyone else.
109
 The court stated that the use of a taser has been 
appropriate in instances where an individual actively resists arrest but not 
in instances where an individual does not exhibit active resistance.
110
 The 
majority claimed the “facts indicate some level of resistance,” but went 
on to state that “nothing suggests Mr. Leija’s resistance was anything 
more than passive.”
111
 The majority then continued, “On appeal, the par-
ties raise several arguments regarding the struggle that followed the ini-
tial taser strike” but that the court “need not address these arguments 




With regard to clearly established law, the majority stated that the 
analysis of excessive force under Graham is “necessarily fact-specific, 
and thus prior cases do not need to involve all of the same factual cir-
cumstances or factors in order for an excessive force violation to be 
clearly established.”
113
 Instead, the court explained that a “sliding scale” 
should be utilized where the more egregious the conduct, the less speci-
ficity required from prior case law to establish a violation.
114
  
The majority relied primarily on five cases to show that the law was 
clearly established, such that the officers could not reasonably tase Mr. 
Leija.
115
 First, the majority distinguished Hinton v. City of Elwood, where 
officers used reasonable force when a misdemeanant ignored an officer’s 
orders to stop, shoved the officer, then resisted arrest by biting the of-
  
 105. Id. at  1157. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (citing Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 829 (9th Cir.2010)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at  1158. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1158–59. 
 113. Id. at  1159. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at  1160. 
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ficer.
116
 The court stated that this is different from the situation at hand 
because Mr. Leija did not actively resist or flee.
117
 Beyond that, the ma-
jority looked favorably upon the four remaining cases. It analogized Ca-
sey v. City of Federal Heights, where it was unreasonable that a nonvio-
lent, nonthreatening misdemeanant was tased without warning.
118
 Then, 
it turned to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Oliver v. Florino, where 
the court held it was unreasonable for officers to tase a mentally unstable 
individual when he was suspected of no crime, was compliant, and posed 
no immediate threat.
119
 Next, the majority looked at the District Court of 
Colorado’s opinion in Asten v. City of Boulder, where it was unreasona-
ble to tase a mentally unstable woman when she posed no threat to offic-
ers or others, was suspected of no crime, and was tased in her home after 
she did not allow officers to enter.
120
 Finally, the majority turned to 
Borton v. City of Dotham, where it was unreasonable to tase a boisterous, 
disturbed individual who was restrained to a gurney when she had com-
mitted no crime, was outnumbered, and posed no danger or threat.
121
 
Beyond merely listing the relevant cases, the majority did not com-
pare or contrast the details of each with the situation at hand. Rather the 
court stated that the cases cited “do not exactly mirror the factual circum-
stances of our case” but that “the qualified immunity analysis involves 
more than a ‘scavenger hunt for prior cases with precisely the same 
facts.’”
122
 It then stated, “[W]e conclude that Graham, Casey, Cruz, and 
the other pertinent authorities sufficiently put Appellants on notice that it 
is not objectively reasonable to employ a taser” in this case.
123
 The ma-
jority further asserted that factual issues still need to be resolved, includ-
ing whether Mr. Leija was slinging blood at the officers, the extent the 
officers knew of Mr. Leija’s illness, and whether Mr. Leija showed more 
than passive resistance in the moments before he was tased.
124
 Upon this 
basis, the majority denied qualified immunity but stated that if the facts 




D. Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Phillips wrote the dissent.
126
 The dissent reached an opposite 
conclusion in light of the circumstances, Mr. Leija’s actions, and an in-
quiry of excessive force and qualified immunity. Judge Phillips stated, “I 
  
 116. Id. (citing Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 781 (10th Cir.1993)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (citing Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 119. Id. (citing Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 901, 906–07 (11th Cir. 2009)). 
 120. Id. (citing Asten v. City of Boulder, 652 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1203 (D. Colo. 2009)). 
 121. Id. (citing Borton v. City of Dothan, 734 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1249–50 (M.D. Ala. 2010)). 
 122. Id. (citation omitted). 
 123. Id. 1160–61. 
 124. Id. at 1161. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
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disagree with the majority’s characterizations that ‘[Mr. Leija] posed no 
threat to the police officers or anyone else’; that the ‘officers tased a sub-
ject who was not detained or not exhibiting active resistance’; [and] that . 
. . ‘nothing suggests Mr. Leija’s resistance was anything more than pas-
sive.’”
127
 He also disagreed with the characterization of Mr. Leija as 
nonviolent and nonthreatening.
128
 Instead, the dissent explained, “[T]he 
facts show that during this episode Mr. Leija . . . was out of control.”
129
 
Mr. Leija was “anything but passive, non-violent, and non-
threatening.”
130
 Mr. Leija yelled, screamed, and frightened the nurse and 
doctor with his aggressive behavior such that the doctor felt the need to 
retreat from the room.
131
 Mr. Leija was bleeding enough to leave blood 
on the floor, wall, and toilet.
132
 His behavior was not passive when the 
officers arrived, and “the majority [did] not consider the effect this had 
on the welfare of other patients in the hospital or consider the possibility 
that someone in Mr. Leija’s disturbed state might pose a threat to 
them.”
133
 The district court determined that the officers did in fact com-
mand Mr. Leija several times to calm down and get to his knees, and 
they warned him that if he did not comply he would be tased.
134
 It was 
only after Mr. Leija’s failure to comply that the officer fired the taser.
135
 
The taser had no effect, causing the officers to resort to grabbing Mr. 
Leija’s arm, turning him to the wall, and using a dry sting from the 
taser.
136
 The dissent expressed that “[t]o say that Mr. Leija was passive in 
this encounter is more than the facts can bear.”
137
 
The dissent went on to note that the majority did not acknowledge 
the danger to the officers that Mr. Leija’s “steady stream of blood” posed 
and that the officers “feared with good reason” a physical struggle would 
put them in contact with the blood.
138
 Judge Philips stated, “I believe the 
officers acted reasonably for their own safety,” and noted that the offic-
ers employed the taser after Mr. Leija refused their commands and all 
else failed; alternatively, using only physical force or letting Mr. Leija 
walk out the door, were “hardly attractive” options.
139
 Judge Philips ex-
plained that the reasonableness of the officers’ actions is demonstrated 
“by a simple question: What else should the officer have done?”
140
 The 
district court “merely (and without explanation) found that genuine is-
  
 127. Id. at  1163 (quoting the majority). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at  1163–64. 
 135. Id. at  1164. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1164–65. 
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sues of material fact existed about Leija’s degree of resistance . . . [and] 
concluded that the officers’ testimony was ‘inconsistent’ but never de-
scribed in what way.”
141
  
With regard to clearly established law, the dissent refuted all of the 
majority’s claims and reliance on case law. The dissent explained that the 
extreme case of Casey involved shocking facts: a man challenged a traf-
fic ticket; lost; and upon going to his truck and returning to pay his fine, 
an officer intercepted him and ordered him to his truck.
142
 When the man 
replied he needed to return, in part to get his daughter, the officer 
grabbed Casey’s arm, put it in a painful lock, and jumped on his back.
143
 
Another officer arrived and almost immediately tased him twice, with a 
third attempt even after the officers took the man to the ground and re-
peatedly banged his face into the concrete.
144
 Judge Philips stated, “I fail 
to understand how the majority likens the peaceful Mr. Casey to the 
combative Mr. Leija . . . [where] Mr. Casey was tackled and tasered 
twice for no apparent reason.”
145
  
Judge Philips explained that none of the cases the majority relied on 
resemble Mr. Leija’s actions and they “provide no basis for a conclusion 
that the three officers should have known that their actions violated 
clearly established law. None of the cited cases involved the same medi-
cal emergency . . . or a corresponding need for force to subdue a com-
bative person.”
146
 He stated that the “majority [failed] to acknowledge 
the urgency of Mr. Leija’s medical condition and the danger he posed to 
the officers and others.”
147
 “Despite the tragic death of Mr. Leija,” the 
officers acted reasonably and were entitled to summary judgment on 




In Aldaba, the Tenth Circuit denied qualified immunity to police of-
ficers who used a taser when dealing with a non-compliant, aggressive, 
mentally disturbed individual.
149
 In doing so, the court departed from 
common trends and placed greater weight on the individual’s mental 
state than has been generally done in other circuits until now. In effect, 
the Tenth Circuit perverted the original purpose of qualified immunity. 
The next sections illustrate that Aldaba ignored undisputed, material 
facts and relied on vague law in order to deny qualified immunity. It dis-
  
 141. Id. at 1166 (quoting the majority). 
 142. Id. at  1169 (citing Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1280–86 (10th Cir. 
2007)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at  1170. 
 146. Id.   
 147. Id. at 1171. 
 148. Id. at 1161. 
 149. Id. at 1159–61.  
16 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
torted precedent, effectively destroying the purpose of qualified immuni-
ty and inappropriately creating a new standard for police use of force in 
situations involving altercations with mentally disturbed individuals. An 
alternative method of examining use of force involving mentally dis-
turbed individuals is more appropriate. 
A. Aldaba Ignored Uncontested Material Facts and Relied on Ambiguous 
Law 
There are significant concerns with the majority’s examination of 
Aldaba. The Tenth Circuit has recognized a defendant may immediately 
appeal a denial of qualified immunity based on a “determination that the 
law allegedly violated by the defendant was clearly established at the 
time of the challenged actions.”
150
 Similarly, a defendant may immedi-
ately appeal a denial of qualified immunity based on a “determination 
that under either party's version of the facts the defendant violated clearly 
established law.”
151
 If neither party’s version of the facts supports a deni-
al of qualified immunity, a case is rightfully and immediately appeala-
ble.
152
  Further, if no cases “squarely govern[] the case” at hand, this may 
suggest that the circumstances fall within the “hazy border between ex-




First and of utmost concern, the majority ignored material, undis-
puted facts established in the district court that heavily weigh in favor of 
qualified immunity. The lower court plainly stated that “[t]he events that 
transpired . . . are, in large part, undisputed.”
154
 Mr. Leija voluntarily 
presented to the emergency room and was initially “cooperative, respon-
sive, and in full agreement with the decision to admit him into the hospi-
tal for treatment.”
155
 As evening approached, his mood and demeanor 
changed.
156
 Leija disconnected his oxygen, severed his IV tubing, and 
was bleeding from his arms to the point that blood was on the floor and 
toilet.
157
 He became confused, anxious, and refused to take medication to 
relieve his anxiety.
158
 His oxygen and IV tubing were reconnected, but he 
continued to remove them.
159
 He refused treatment and yelled at hospital 
  
 150. Shroff v. Spellman, 604 F.3d 1179, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Foote v. Spiegel, 
118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir.1997)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at  1186–87, 1189. 
 153. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)). 
 154. Aldaba v. Bd. of Marshall Cty. Comm'rs, No. CIV-12-85-FHS, 2013 WL 1403333, at *1 
(E.D. Okla. Apr. 5, 2013) aff'd sub nom. Aldaba v. Pickens, 777 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2015) cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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staff claiming he was being told lies and secrets.
160
 He “continued to be 
uncooperative and his aggressiveness increased.
161
 Leija continued yell-
ing and told the nursing staff not to approach him.
162
 He claimed the staff 
was trying to poison him.”
163
 Staff “attempted to calm Leija, but Leija 
began yelling ‘I am Superman. I am God. You are telling me lies and 
trying to kill me.’”
164
 The doctor believed Leija was harming himself by 
removing his oxygen and IV and refusing medication.
165
 Mr. Leija would 
not allow staff to administer medication, and because the staff did not 
believe they could restrain Mr. Leija, they called law enforcement for 
assistance.
166
 The doctor “observed Leija's aggressive behavior and left 
Leija's room when Leija started to step towards him.
167
 It was [the doc-
tor’s] opinion that he and [his staff] could not secure Leija to his bed to 
treat and evaluate him without the assistance of law enforcement offi-
cials.”
168
 Mr. Leija then left his room in his hospital gown and began 
walking down the hall; when the officers arrived, they observed him 
“standing in the hall, yelling and screaming that people were trying to 
poison and kill him. Leija was visibly agitated and upset.”
169
 Officer 
Pickens “was informed by medical personnel that Leija was ill and that 
he could die if he left the hospital. Pickens attempted to persuade Leija to 
return to his room, but Leija refused and said the hospital staff was trying 
to kill him.”
170
 Despite Officer Pickens’s attempts to talk to Mr. Leija, he 
continued down the hallway toward the lobby, and he “continued with 
his aggressive behavior by pulling the remaining IV from his arms caus-
ing blood to come out.”
171
 Mr. Leija then “faced the officers and 
clenched and shook his fists. Leija caused more bleeding when he re-
moved the gauze and tape from his arms, and he raised his arms and stat-
ed that this was his blood.”
172
 Mr. Leija did not comply with the officers’ 
commands and did not heed warnings that the officers would tase him if 
he did not comply.
173
 The first attempt to tase Mr. Leija did not appear to 
affect Mr. Leija.
174
 The officers then attempted to restrain Mr. Leija, and 
Mr. Leija resisted, leading to a physical struggle where officers used a 




 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at *2. 
 165. Id. 
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 168. Id. 
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 173. Id. 
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These undisputed facts, as the dissent pointed out, are contrary to 
the majority’s presentation of Mr. Leija’s noncompliance as passive. The 
district court explained that Mr. Leija did more than just ignore the offic-
ers’ commands—he clenched and shook his fists, raised his arms, and 
engaged in a physical struggle with the officers. The majority skirted 
these issues by arguing that prior to the initial taser use and before the 
physical struggle escalated, Mr. Leija was only passively resisting.
176
 
Therefore, the first use of the taser prior to the primary physical struggle 
was excessive force.
177
 The majority stated that the video footage only 
indicated that Mr. Leija was walking away from officers but did not 
show more because the events moved outside the camera’s view.
178
 The 
majority also stated that the officers’ testimony was inconsistent in re-
gards to events not depicted in the video footage, but neither the majority 
nor the lower court explained how the testimony was inconsistent.
179
 
This arbitrary finding of inconsistent testimony without providing sup-
port from the evidence is of great concern. In asserting this, the majority 
found that Mr. Leija exhibited only passive resistance, and thus, the ini-
tial taser deployment sufficiently demonstrated excessive force.
180
 The 
majority supported this argument by citing previous cases where force 
was excessive and where the individuals involved were largely compli-
ant, posed no threat, and only resisted when they did not allow officers 
into a home or when they were restrained to a gurney.
181
  
In its determination, the majority completely ignored the undisputed 
fact that Mr. Leija was behaving aggressively in addition to walking 
away and ignoring officer commands. Unlike the previous cases the ma-
jority cited, Mr. Leija was not largely compliant, merely denying officers 
access to his home, or restrained in any way. Rather, he was actively 
attempting to leave the hospital while making aggressive gestures and 
fitful statements. This is not mere passive resistance. The dissent sup-
ported this assertion and stated,  “[T]he facts show that during this epi-
sode Mr. Leija (because of his medical condition) was out of control. . . . 
[and] the evidence shows that Mr. Leija was anything but passive, non-
violent, and non-threatening.”
182
 The dissent explained:  
The doctor and male nurse called law enforcement for help in re-
straining Mr. Leija after concluding that they could not do it them-
  
 176. Aldaba v. Pickens, 777 F.3d 1148, 1158–59 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 
136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Aldaba, 777 F.3d at  1153; Bd. of Marshall Cty. Comm'rs, 2013 WL 1403333, at *6; 
see also, Aldaba, 777 F.3d at  1166 (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Aldaba, 777 F.3d at 1158–59. 
 181. Id. at 1160 (citing Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 901, 906–07 (11th Cir. 2009); Asten v. 
City of Boulder, 652 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1203 (D. Colo. 2009); Borton v. City of Dothan , 734 
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 182. Aldaba, 777 F.3d at  1163 (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
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selves. . . . Mr. Leija yelled and screamed delusional claims and ac-
cusations. . . . He had frightened the nurse and doctor with his ag-
gressive behavior, causing the doctor to retreat from Mr. Leija's room 
after Mr. Leija acted aggressively and began stepping toward him. 
Even . . . before tearing the IV needle from his arm . . . , Mr. Leija 
was bleeding sufficiently to leave blood on the floor, wall, and toilet. 
Nor did Mr. Leija's behavior become passive after the officers ar-
rived. When the officers first encountered Mr. Leija, he was still yell-
ing about being God and Superman and claiming that the hospital 
staff was trying to poison him. . . . [T]he majority [did] not consider 
the effect this had on the welfare of other patients in the hospital or 
consider the possibility that someone in Mr. Leija's disturbed state 




As the dissent pointed out, the undisputed facts are sufficient to 
award qualified immunity. Despite this, the majority stated a factual dis-
pute existed. In actuality, any factual dispute that existed does not mate-
rially affect the timeline of events the majority relied on in asserting the 
officers sufficiently demonstrated excessive force when they first decid-
ed to tase Mr. Leija. The factual issues the majority claimed still need to 
be resolved, including whether Mr. Leija was slinging blood at the offic-
ers and the extent the officers knew of Mr. Leija’s illness, do not warrant 
a denial of qualified immunity. If Mr. Leija was not slinging blood, the 
facts already indicated that he was not merely passive. If he was slinging 
blood, this only adds support to using a taser. Further, the facts, disputed 
or undisputed, do not suggest that if the officers had more extensive 
knowledge of Mr. Leija’s illness this knowledge would have or should 
have changed the circumstances. The officers knew Mr. Leija was ill and 
he risked dying if he left the hospital. There is no indication that the hos-
pital staff knew or reasonably should have known that Mr. Leija’s specif-
ic medical condition made him more susceptible to a taser. Further, the 
hospital staff did not communicate any information to the officers that 
would have led them to suspect using a taser would risk any more harm 
to Mr. Leija than it would to anyone else. Additionally, the medical ex-
aminer’s testimony only indicated that the taser could have increased Mr. 
Leija’s need for oxygen, not that it did increase his need or that medical 
staff or police officers should have known it could increase his need. In 
fact, the medical examiner also testified that the “exertion caused by Mr. 
Leija's physical struggle with the officers ‘exacerbated his underlying 
pneumonia.’”
184
 Mr. Leija’s own actions in physically resisting the offic-
ers after the initial taser deployment exacerbated his condition while the 
facts show that the first taser use itself had no effect.
185
 This does not 
support the majority’s assertion that the initial taser deployment consti-
  
 183. Id. 
 184. Aldaba, 777 F.3d at 1153. 
 185. See id. at  1164. 
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tuted excessive force. Nothing in the events that transpired alerted the 
officers that Mr. Leija’s medical condition weighed against taser use in 
this situation. 
Further, prior cases involving individuals exhibiting only passive 
resistance do not mirror the circumstances here, making it difficult to 
understand why the majority characterizes Mr. Leija’s resistance as such. 
For instance, in Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, the Tenth Circuit found 
that the use of a taser was unreasonable when an individual exhibited 
only passive resistance.
186
 In Cavanaugh, officers responded to a non-
emergency call requesting help in finding Ms. Cavanaugh after a domes-
tic dispute where she had consumed alcohol and pain medication and 
stormed out of her home.
187
 When an officer found Ms. Cavanaugh walk-
ing outside towards her home, he tased her.
188
 The officer was told Ms. 
Cavanaugh may have a knife, but he did not see a knife in her hands and 
gave no warning before deploying the taser.
189
 Ms. Cavanaugh was not 
actively resisting, fleeing arrest, acting aggressively, or threatening the 
officer. 
190
 Based on these facts, the court held that the use of force was 
objectively unreasonable.
191
 This instance is similar to Mr. Leija’s in that 
Ms. Cavanaugh was walking away from the officer, but it is very differ-
ent in that Ms. Cavanaugh was not ignoring an officer’s commands and 
was not given a warning prior to the taser use. Mr. Leija was acting ag-
gressively, and he was purposefully ignoring the officers’ commands and 
warnings while attempting to leave the hospital. 
In the Ninth Circuit, Judge Wardlaw’s concurring opinion to a deni-
al of rehearing in Bryan v. MacPherson provided a thorough analysis of 
passive resistance and taser use. The opinion stated that an officer used 
excessive force when he deployed his taser in order “to apprehend Carl 
Bryan for a seatbelt infraction, where Bryan was obviously and noticea-
bly unarmed, made no threatening statements or gestures, did not resist 
arrest or attempt to flee, but was standing inert twenty to twenty-five feet 
away from the officer.”
192
 The opinion explained that a taser is an inter-
mediate level of force, which must be justified by the circumstances and 
governmental interests involved.
193
 In doing so, the opinion recognized 
that it is a “settled principle that police officers need not employ the 
‘least intrusive’ degree of force,”
194
 but the court will consider the pres-
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In Mr. Leija’s case, the majority clearly stated that the undisputed 
facts warranted some level of force, but it failed to suggest what level 
and type of force would have been appropriate. In absence of further 
explanation, the majority appears to suggest that physical force may have 
been appropriate, yet the dissent pointed out that the officers would have 
risked exposure to Mr. Leija’s blood if they had attempted to restrain him 
physically first. Mr. Leija was undisputedly dripping with blood. It is 
thoughtless to require officers to expose themselves to an individual’s 
blood, purely to avoid using a less-lethal alternative means of force—a 
taser—that could prevent their contact with blood. In light of the princi-
ple that officers need not use the lowest level of force available, risk of 
exposure to blood weighs in favor of officers choosing to deploy a taser 
instead of physically engaging. Additionally, studies indicate that the risk 
of harm to both officers and individuals being apprehended is significant-
ly higher when physical force is used compared to situations when a taser 
is deployed in lieu of physical force.
196
 Furthermore, the undisputed fact 
that Mr. Leija was dripping blood also supports a more urgent need to 
prevent him from entering the hospital lobby where he would have risked 
accidentally flinging his blood on members of the public or at the very 
least dripping blood all over the floor of a public area. Protecting the 
general public from exposure to a mentally incapacitated individual’s 
blood in his attempt to escape medical treatment is a legitimate and sig-
nificant interest weighing in favor of taser use. 
Given the undisputed facts, the majority opinion created a factual 
dispute in order to avoid addressing more fully the legal standards set by 
precedent. While the majority claimed the law is clearly established that 
it was unreasonable for officers to deploy a taser in this situation, in re-
ality, the law is ambiguous. The majority made broad generalizations 
based on cases with factual circumstances vastly different from the facts 
in Aldaba. Shortly after the Tenth Circuit decided Aldaba, the Supreme 
Court rejected such broad assertions of law in Mullenix v. Luna,
197
 caus-
ing the Aldaba judgment to be vacated and remanded for further consid-
eration in light of Mullenix.
198
 In Mullenix, the Supreme Court explained 
that courts must not define clearly established law at a high level of gen-
erality.
199
 The dispositive issue is whether the nature of the particular 
conduct is a clearly established violation in light of the specific context 




 196. See, e.g., ERIC H. HOLDER, JR. ET AL, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICE USE OF FORCE, 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF: T ASERS AND OTHER LESS-LETHAL WEAPONS 13–14 (2011), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232215.pdf (indicating the use of conducted energy devices 
(“CEDs”) such as tasers “substantially decreased the likelihood of suspect injury” where as “physi-
cal force and hands-on control increase the risk of injury to officers and suspects”).  
 197. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015). 
 198. Pickens v. Aldaba, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
 199. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308. 
 200. Id. 
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Mullenix, the Supreme Court considered a Fifth Circuit ruling that an 
officer violated clearly established law prohibiting the use of deadly 
force against a fleeing felon who did not pose a sufficient threat of harm 
to the officer or others.
201
 The Court declared that it had already rejected 
qualified immunity formulations that define clearly established law at a 
high level of generality.
202
 The Court explained that it previously estab-
lished, in its 2004 decision in Brosseau v. Haugen, that the proper in-
quiry is whether the law is clearly established such that it prohibits the 
officer’s conduct in the situation confronted.
203
 Additionally, the Court 
has held an officer is entitled to qualified immunity in instances where 
none of the cases examined “squarely govern[]” the case at hand.
204
 “The 
relevant inquiry is whether existing precedent placed the conclusion that 




In Aldaba, the majority stated that the cases it examined “do not ex-
actly mirror the factual circumstances of our case, but ‘the qualified im-
munity analysis involves more than a scavenger hunt for prior cases with 
precisely the same facts.’”
206
 This is directly contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Mullenix prohibiting broad statements of law, and as the 
dissent explained, the law in these circumstances is not beyond debate. 
Even prior to Mullenix, the majority should have been aware of the Su-
preme Court’s assertion in Brosseau that a court should not base a denial 
of qualified immunity on general characterizations of law.
207
 Instead, the 
majority relied on earlier Supreme Court rules from Hope v. Pelzer, as it 
has done in previous cases,
208
 to justify its broad conclusions of law 
based on factually distinct cases. This is inappropriate. In Brosseau, the 
Supreme Court explained that the proposition of Hope “that there need 
not be materially similar case[s] for the right to be clearly established,” is 
only appropriate in instances where the constitutional violation is “obvi-
ous.”
209
 If the case is not obvious, generalized Fourth Amendment stand-
ards are inappropriate.
210
 Aldaba’s muddled reasoning clearly does not 
support that the use of force was excessive in any obvious way.  
In finding clearly established law, the Supreme court has declared, 
“[W]hat is necessary absent controlling authority: a robust ‘consensus of 
  
 201. Id. at  308–09. 
 202. Id. at  308 (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). 
 203. Id. at 308–09. 
 204. Id. at  309 (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam)). 
 205. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). 
 206. Aldaba v. Pickens, 777 F.3d 1148, 1160 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 136 
S. Ct. 479 (2015) (quoting Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, 625 F.3d 661, 666 (10th Cir. 2010)). 
 207. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198–99. 
 208. Shroff v. Spellman, 604 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 
730, 740–41 (2002)). 
 209. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199. 
 210. See id. 
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cases of persuasive authority.’”
211
 Other Supreme Court cases decided 
after Aldaba also support using a “robust consensus of cases of persua-
sive authority” in the courts of appeals to “clearly establish the federal 
right” alleged.
212
 On remand, the Tenth Circuit will have to reexamine 
Aldaba, and its overarching methods for examining qualified immunity, 
in order to rectify its reliance on unclear law that did not put officers on 
notice of a possible Fourth Amendment violation under the circumstanc-
es at hand. 
B. Aldaba Distorted Precedent, Effectively Destroying the Purpose of 
Qualified Immunity  
The Tenth Circuit effectively destroyed the purpose of qualified 
immunity by denying it to the officers in Aldaba. Precedent dictates that 
a court should deny qualified immunity only for objectively unreasona-
ble levels of force, in light of the circumstances present. The Supreme 
Court in Graham stated, “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long 
recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop neces-
sarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or 
threat thereof to effect it.”
213
 Qualified immunity examinations of rea-
sonableness of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasona-
ble officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind-
sight.”
214
 Further, excessive force must be examined in light of what is 
reasonable at the moment. As the Court noted:  
Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the 
peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment. The 
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that 
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about 
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.
215
 
The Supreme Court emphasized that even in looking back at the cir-
cumstances at issue, officers must be allowed some leeway in their deci-
sions to use certain levels of force, due to the stressful and “rapidly 
evolving” situations they must act in.
216
 
The Tenth Circuit in Aldaba afforded the police officers no such 
consideration. The facts, as the dissent pointed out, depicted an aggres-
  
 211. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 
(1999)). 
 212. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (quoting City & Cty. of San Francisco v. 
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015)); City & Cty. of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. at 1778. 
 213. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. at  396–97 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 216. Id. 
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sive, noncompliant individual who was not in his right mind.
217
 The cir-
cumstances of Aldaba are quite similar to those of Giannetti, where the 
Tenth Circuit found force was reasonable in response to a combative 
woman who, despite reasonable force, died just after the encounter.
218
 
Both cases involved individuals who were mentally disturbed, and both 
cases involved individuals who did not follow police commands, were 
aggressive, and required the force of more than one officer in order to 
subdue them. Yet, these cases have opposite holdings and taken together 
muddle Tenth Circuit qualified immunity standards.  
Aldaba ignored the facts of the situation, even though the Supreme 
Court has stated that the facts are determinative in qualified immunity 
and excessive force examinations. Additionally, Aldaba expected the 
officers to have time to investigate to an unreasonable degree the physi-
cal and mental state of an individual who, upon their arrival, was drip-
ping blood and headed to the lobby of a hospital where there were un-
doubtedly other patients, patrons, and staff attempting to go about their 
business. The majority then expected the officers to deal with this indi-
vidual despite this individual’s resistance to verbal commands and warn-
ings. If the medical staff could have handled the situation so easily, they 
would not have needed the police officers in the first place. 
Other circuits would likely have ruled otherwise in this situation. 
For instance, the Eleventh Circuit encountered a situation similar to Al-
daba in Bussey-Morice v. Gomez, involving the death of Preston Bussey 
III. In Bussey-Morice, Bussey presented at a hospital with bleeding arms, 
complaining of a leech that needed to be removed, and based on Bus-
sey’s aggressive manner and the nature of his wounds, hospital staff be-
lieved that he was having an acute psychotic attack.
219
 Bussey would not 
let anyone touch him, the nurses felt threatened by him, and he eventual-
ly became more aggressive, threatening that he would throw blood on 
hospital security and attempting to leave the hospital.
220
 Hospital staff 
called police officers to assist in the situation.
221
 Despite attempts to calm 
Bussey down by talking to him and giving him commands, the officers 
had no luck in subduing him.
222
 The officers tased Bussey after repeated 
noncompliant, aggressive responses to the officers’ attempts to calm 
him.
223
 The initial tasing had no effect, and the officers ultimately tased 
Bussey three times in addition to physically struggling with him.
224
 After 
the officers were finally able to handcuff Bussey and the hospital staff 
  
 217. Aldaba v. Pickens, 777 F.3d 1148, 1163 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 136 
S. Ct. 479 (2015) (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
 218. Giannetti v. City of Stillwater, 216 F. App’x 756, 757 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 219. Bussey-Morice v. Gomez, 587 F. App’x 621, 622 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 220. Id. at 622–23. 
 221. Id. at 623. 
 222. Id. at 623–24. 
 223. Id.  
 224. Id. at 624. 
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were able to administer medications to calm him down, Bussey died.
225
 
A medical expert testified that the taser, in combination with cocaine-
induced delirium, had caused Bussey’s death.
226
 The Eleventh Circuit 
held that qualified immunity protected the police officers from the exces-
sive use of force claim because clearly established law did not preclude 
repeated uses of a taser based on these circumstances.
227
  
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit addressed mental health in a 
qualified immunity examination in Long v. Slaton. There, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by 
fatally shooting a mentally unstable individual attempting to flee in the 
officer’s car, even though the individual had not operated the car danger-
ously.
228
 The court explained “the law does not require officers in a tense 
and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a suspect uses a deadly 
weapon to act to stop the suspect,” and the officer had reason to believe 
the individual was dangerous, based in part on his unstable state of mind 
and his ignoring officer commands to stop.
229
 The court also rejected the 
claim that the officer should have first attempted less lethal methods be-
fore fatally shooting the individual.
230
 The court stated that the unpre-
dictability of the individual’s behavior and his fleeing indicated “the po-
lice need not have taken the chance and hoped for the best.”
231
 
The facts of Bussey-Morice are extremely similar to those in Alda-
ba. In both cases, an individual presented at a hospital and became ag-
gressive such that hospital staff felt they were unable to control the situa-
tion adequately. Police officers responded, and a physical struggle and 
multiple uses of a taser resulted from the individual’s noncompliance, 
aggression, and actions influenced by mental instability. Yet, the rulings 
in Bussey-Morice and Aldaba are the opposite—in the Eleventh Circuit, 
qualified immunity was granted, and in the Tenth Circuit, it was not. 
Given that the Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity is based 
on “giv[ing] ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but 
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,”
232
 it is 
difficult to reconcile why the Tenth Circuit denied qualified immunity in 
Aldaba. Further, while the situation in Long was more extreme than Al-
daba, in that Long involved lethal force and a mentally unstable individ-
ual fleeing in a vehicle, the court’s focus on the instability of the individ-
  
 225. Id. at 624–25. 
 226. Id. at 625 (indicating disagreement among experts but stating “Bussey–Morice's expert . .  
. opined that the multiple Taser applications caused Bussey's death .”).  
 227. Id. at 630. 
 228. Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 581–83 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 229. Id. at  581. 
 230. Id. at  583. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Aldaba v. Pickens, 777 F.3d 1148, 1162 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 136 
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ual in light of the circumstances weighed in favor of force rather than 
against it. Aldaba did just the opposite and declared that mental instabil-
ity should weigh against use of force. This circuit inconsistency creates 
ambiguous standards, making it difficult to identify clearly what factors 
will or will not support police use of force. 
The Sixth Circuit has also dealt with similar situations and granted 
qualified immunity.
233
 In Caie v. West Bloomfield Township, police of-
ficers responded to a request for a welfare check for Jason Caie, a report-
edly depressed, suicidal, and intoxicated individual.
234
 Caie’s friends 
called law enforcement for assistance after unsuccessful attempts to con-
vince Caie, who was behaving irrationally, to go to the hospital.
235
 Police 
officers found Caie standing in lake water, and they requested that he 
come out of the water multiple times; Caie was uncooperative and simp-
ly stated that he wanted to die.
236
 Eventually, the officers persuaded him 
to come to the shore, though he continued to behave erratically.
237
 On 
shore, Caie was noncompliant again.
238
 Officers eventually took him to 
the ground while he was waving his arms violently.
239
 After being unable 
to handcuff Caie and after warning Caie he would be tased if he did not 
cooperate, the officers tased Caie while he was lying on the ground with 
his arms under his body.
240
 The officers were then able to handcuff him 
and take him to the hospital.
241
 The Sixth Circuit held that the use of the 
taser did not violate Caie’s constitutional rights.
242
 The court found that 
Caie had exhibited enough resistance to justify the use of force.
243
 
In the case of Caie, the individual was outside, as opposed to in a 
hospital like Mr. Leija in Aldaba, and Caie does not report other individ-
uals present. Thus, Caie was only a threat to his own well-being, and 
while he was uncooperative and waived his arms violently, he was not 
otherwise aggressive or dangerous toward the officers. However, the 
situation still warranted qualified immunity. Compared with Aldaba, Mr. 
Leija was more aggressive and a greater risk to the police officers and 
others, given the hospital setting with others present and given Mr. Lei-
ja’s dripping blood.
244
 It is difficult to reconcile this discrepancy between 
  
 233. See, e.g., Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2012); 
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the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Caie and the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Aldaba.  
C. Aldaba Inappropriately Created a New Standard; An Alternative Ex-
amination  
The Tenth Circuit’s consideration of the mental condition of an in-
dividual involved in a police confrontation went too far and it created a 
new standard of examining excessive force. The majority in Aldaba ef-
fectively suggested that, when considering excessive force claims in rela-
tion to qualified immunity, a court should primarily consider the mental 
stability of an individual and secondarily consider the actions or events 
that take place. The majority further implied that officers should always 
reduce the amount of force they use when reacting to mentally disturbed 
individuals.  
To explain, the majority referenced the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Deorle, stating that even when a disturbed individual is “‘acting out’ and 
inviting officers to use deadly force to subdue him, the governmental 
interest in using such force is diminished by the fact that the officers are 
confronted not with a person who has committed a serious crime against 
others, but with a mentally ill individual”
245
 who needs protecting, rather 
than reprimanding. The Ninth Circuit specifically referred to deadly 
force. In general, many consider the taser a less-than-lethal option, not 
deadly force.
246
 The majority in Aldaba did not address this distinction 
yet held that the use of the taser was excessive. Either the majority ig-
nored the difference between lethal and less-than-lethal force, a distinc-
tion not to be taken lightly given that one is likely to end in death and the 
other is not, or the majority implied that the use of a taser is deadly force, 
an allegation not supported by scientific data.
247
 Yet again, the majority’s 
holding is hard to resolve, given its ambiguities and lack of explanation. 
Similarly, the majority referenced the Ninth Circuit again when stating 
that directly causing an individual “grievous injury” does not serve the 
governmental interest in protecting the mentally disturbed from self-
harm.
248
 In applying this to the situation in Aldaba, the majority implied 
that tasers cause grievous harm but only in regards to mentally disturbed 
individuals—a contention that has been raised elsewhere but not proven 
or widely accepted. Taken together, these references to Ninth Circuit 
precedent suggest that the majority believed that the existence or lack of 
mental disturbance should be the primary focus in an excessive force 
claim. 
  
 245. Aldaba v. Pickens, 777 F.3d 1148, 1156 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 136 
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This implication poses many problems. First, as the dissent pointed 
out, the majority failed to establish any viable alternative actions that the 
officers in Aldaba could have taken. The officers attempted to calm Mr. 
Leija down and gave him warnings before using the taser or physical 
force, but their attempts failed. Additionally, the majority stated that 
when an “individual poses a more severe and immediate threat to him-
self, a higher level of force may be reasonable in order to seize him for 
protective custody purposes.”
249
 Medical personnel informed one of the 
officers upon arrival that “Mr. Leija was ill and could die if he left the 
hospital.”
250
 What “more severe and immediate threat”
251
 could Mr. Leija 
have posed to himself other than death? Given the severity of harm 
risked, using a taser—a less-than-lethal device—rather than allowing Mr. 
Leija to leave and potentially die, is the preferred action. The officers 
feared for their own safety and the risk of exposure to Mr. Leija’s blood 
if they attempted to use physical force alone.
252
 Thus, the risk of Mr. 
Leija’s death if he left, combined with the officers’ risk of harm from 
Mr. Leija’s blood, justified taser use. 
It is also important to note that studies have shown that certain men-
tal illnesses come with a higher propensity for violence.
253
 Most law en-
forcement officers are not experts in mental health. It is unreasonable for 
police officers to be expected to recognize and evaluate the many differ-
ent types of mental disturbances that might indicate an individual is more 
or less dangerous and might require more or less force given his or her 
mental state, especially in a matter of seconds when officers arrive on 
scene. Additionally, in hospital situations, health care professionals, and 
mental health care professionals in particular, are at a statistically higher 
risk of violence and harm than professionals in other settings.
254
 The 
hospital situation itself may suggest the need for higher levels of force by 
police. In order to adapt to the high-risk setting in a hospital, police of-
ficers need less-than-lethal, yet greater-than-verbal, ways to deal with 
aggressive and possibly mentally disturbed hospital patrons. Aldaba 
failed to take into account the high stress setting of hospitals and the 
greater likelihood that police responding to hospital calls will be required 
to deal with mentally disturbed individuals prone to violence. 
Additionally, Aldaba created an unreasonable standard that the 
mental stability of an individual is more important than the health and 
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safety of the police officers and the public. The Tenth Circuit’s implica-
tion that police should use lower levels of force when dealing with men-
tally disturbed individuals threatens officer safety and law enforcement’s 
ability to effectively protect the disturbed individual and the public put in 
harm’s way.  
Further, if police officers do not feel courts will support them in us-
ing force to deal with aggressive, mentally disturbed individuals, they 
may be less willing and less likely to react to situations such as these 
when hospitals request police assistance. It is generally held that police 
officers have no duty to aid individuals in need,
255
 and the ruling of Al-
daba may discourage police officers from responding to requests to help 
those at risk of self-harm, for fear of excessive force claims, such as in 
Aldaba, where qualified immunity may fail them. The Supreme Court 
has recognized a well-established tradition of police discretion, even in 
situations involving apparently mandatory statutes.
256
 Circuit courts have 
followed; in Warren v. D.C., the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
plainly stated that there is a:  
“fundamental principle that a government and its agents are under no 
general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to 
any particular individual citizen.” The duty to provide public services 
is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship be-
tween the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists.
257
 
Unless the circumstances invoke a doctrine that creates a duty for a 
police officer to respond to an individual’s needs, such as the special-
relationship doctrine, a police officer maintains full discretion as to 
whether or not to act to protect or provide aid to a person for whatever 
reason, including to prevent potential self-harm.
258
 A special relationship 
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can exist in a few narrow circumstances, such as where the police created 
or increased a peril by affirmative acts, where the police voluntarily un-
dertook to help an individual, or where the police took affirmative steps 
to aid an individual and consequently lulled the individual into a false 
sense of security.
259
 However, “[c]ourts have refused to find a special 
relationship or impose liability based on the negligence by police per-
sonnel in responding to requests for assistance . . . or in failing to provide 
sufficient protection.”
260
 Thus, a police officer, in his or her discretionary 
power, can simply choose not to act in response to a request for police 
assistance. The harsh ruling in Aldaba may encourage officers in similar 
situations to not respond at all. Contrary to public belief that police offic-
ers are obligated to assist individuals, police officers may decide that 
providing aid in situations like Aldaba is simply too risky, given the 
stringent and ambiguous ruling of the Tenth Circuit, which effectively 
stated that police officers must be able to weigh mental health in use-of-
force considerations to an unreasonable degree that risks police safety 
and ignores public safety. 
Police officers have been accused of responding in this way. The 
recent death of Freddie Gray while in police custody in Baltimore, Mary-
land, and the subsequent charging of police officers involved, has led to 
multiple reports of reduced police presence generally and reduced police 
responses to calls in Baltimore.
261
 Commentary responding to accusa-
tions of reduced police involvement explained that officers did not feel 
supported in their authority to act, and consequently, they were afraid to 
do their jobs and anxious about the extent to which situations must esca-
late to in order for them to feel confident in their authority to act.
262
 The 
denial of qualified immunity in Aldaba may similarly discourage police 
officers and decrease their confidence in their authority to react in situa-
tions dealing with mentally disturbed individuals. Rather than risk an 
excessive force claim, law enforcement officers may simply choose to 
ignore such calls. The hypocritical lack of support for police discretion-
ary authority to react to dangerous situations, yet the expectation that 
they should do so in order to protect mentally disturbed individuals from 
self-harm, leaves police at a standstill. Law enforcement officers are 
caught in a proverbial corner with two equally poor options that will in-
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evitably lead to a negative outcome—do they respond and risk an exces-
sive force claim, or do they decide, in their legally supported discretion, 
to ignore the request for help and possibly incite public ridicule? 
A safer alternative to the implied standard of force in Aldaba is to 
take into consideration the mental health and stability of an individual 
but only as a secondary matter in determining how to react to the indi-
vidual’s potentially aggressive behavior. First and foremost, the actions 
of the individual should dictate the reasonable level of force to use in 
subduing that individual. Courts should consider mental stability as a 
factor in use-of-force considerations only to the extent that doing so can 
be done without creating a greater risk to the police involved or to the 
surrounding public. Officers should instead focus on safety and neutraliz-
ing potentially dangerous situations. In intense situations where it is im-
practical for an officer to use less force, mental disturbance is simply 
irrelevant. Where an individual’s actions dictate using force, force is 
warranted regardless of an individual’s mental state. The presence of a 
mental disturbance should not command officers to use less force than 
they would on an individual with average mental capacity. If the circum-
stances involve a mentally disturbed individual that is predictable enough 
to warrant attempts to deescalate the situation without force, then officers 
should rightfully take mental health into account. However, an aggres-
sive individual’s mental disturbance does not warrant placing law en-
forcement officers, hospital staff, or the general public at greater risk. It 
is only reasonable to reduce force in light of mental illness when officers 
can do so safely. Courts should similarly follow such guidelines in ex-
cessive force examinations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the death of any individual, mentally disturbed or sound, in-
volved in an encounter with law enforcement officers is tragic, qualified 
immunity is designed to protect police officers and other officials when 
events go awry. Without qualified immunity, officials are forced to act in 
fear of suit with every decision they make. It is for this reason that the 
qualified immunity defense was developed. Under the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in Aldaba, police officers must fear every choice they make 
when it involves a mentally disturbed individual. Rather than allowing 
officers to evaluate the situation based on the events taking place—the 
level of aggression exhibited by an individual, the level of risk posed to 
officers or to others, and the level of interest in subduing the individu-
al—officers are forced to investigate the mental stability of aggressors 
they have been called to deal with when no one else can or will subdue 
them. The situations that officers face are often dangerous, and every 
moment that goes by is an opportunity for the situation to escalate or 
deescalate. To ask police officers, many of whom are not experts in men-
tal health, to evaluate the mental stability of a potentially violent individ-
ual and to emphasize this evaluation in weighing the levels of force 
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available in any given situation is simply absurd. Police officers already 
risk enough in their day-to-day jobs. The use-of-force standard that Al-
daba implied effectively destroys the purpose of qualified immunity in 
unpredictable, often dangerous situations involving mentally unstable 
individuals. If the Tenth Circuit continues with the trends it set in Alda-
ba, police officers may no longer be willing to respond to situations in-
volving aggressive, mentally disturbed individuals for fear of suit and 
denial of qualified immunity. The court failed to acknowledge the unrea-
sonable burden that it places on law enforcement officials and their abil-
ity to act quickly, effectively, and safely in their jobs. The Tenth Circuit 
should reexamine the emphasis it places on weighing mental instability 
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